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Over the past 30 years, China has witnessed theflourishing and transformation of multiple forms ofreligiosity, covering a vast range of practices includ-
ing family rites of passage, temple festivals, modern spiritual
networks, ethnic religions, and transnational communities. (1)
Most of these developments have occurred from the bottom
up, outside the institutional sphere assigned to “religion” by
the state, and often escaping its direct control. Much of the
literature on the state’s religious policy during these years
has built on a paradigm of church-state relations in which the
focus has been on monitoring the repression and control of
religion by the state, identifying the limits to religious free-
dom in China, and noting that, since the end of the Cultural
Revolution in 1976, if the overall trend has been one of a
gradual loosening of restrictions on religious life, the state
has continued to assert its ultimate authority over the reli-
gious sphere. (2)
While such an observation is broadly valid, the evolution of
China’s religious policy cannot be described as a simple
process of the state stepping out (or back in) to give more or
less freedom to religious groups and communities. On the
contrary, the state has continued to play a key role in consti-
tuting and structuring the religious field, alongside religious
groups and leaders themselves. To describe this dynamic,
however, we need to avoid uncritically applying a paradigm
of church-state relations derived from the Western experi-
ence, which assumes the prior mutual autonomy of church
and state, describes the tensions and power relations be-
tween the two, and posits that the normal and desirable state
of affairs, in a condition of secularised modernity, is one in
which, while the state is neutral and free from the political
influence of religious institutions, it does not interfere in the
affairs of religious institutions and communities. (3)
This paradigm is a result of the historical trajectory of Eu-
rope, in which the nation-state broke out of the shadow of
the Church of Rome – a trajectory fundamentally different
from the Chinese experience. After the proscription of Bud-
dhism in 842 left the Buddhist sangha permanently weak-
ened, for one thousand years until the nineteenth century no
trans-local religious institution ever managed to secure its in-
dependence from the imperial state, which positioned itself
as the supreme religious authority in a society steeped in re-
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2. See for example Beatrice Leung, “Religious Freedom and the Constitution in the
Peoples’ Republic of China: Interpretation and Implementation,” Diskus, vol. 3, no.
1, 1995, pp. 1-18; Tony Lambert, “The Present Religious Policy of the Chinese
Communist Party,” Religion, State & Society, vol. 29, no. 2, 2001, pp. 121-129;
Pitman Potter, “Belief in Control: Regulation of Religion in China,” China Quarterly,
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Religious Activity,” China Quarterly, no. 184, 2005, pp. 894-913.
3. See Yoshiko Ashiwa and David L. Wank, “Making Religion, Making the State in
China: an Introductory Essay”, in Ashiwa and Wank (eds), Making Religion, Making
the State: The politics of Religion in Modern China, Stanford, University of Stanford
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This article is a study of the continuities and changes in the state-led institutionalisation of religion in the PRC from
1979 to 2009 and their effects on the structuring of China’s religious field. A normative discourse on religion is
constituted by a network of Party leaders, officials, academics, and religious leaders. Official religious institutions
have become hybrids of religious culture with the institutional habitus of work units (danwei) in the socialist market
economy. A wide range of religious practices have found legitimacy under secular labels such as health, science,
culture, tourism, or heritage. Religious affairs authorities have begun to acknowledge the existence of this expanding
realm of religious life, and to accord discursive legitimacy to the previously stigmatised or ignored categories of
popular religion and new religions, but hesitate to propose an explicit change in policy. 
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ligiosity without a clear distinction between the religious and
the secular. For a century from the Opium War (1843) until
Liberation (1949), the Christian churches asserted their in-
dependence from the Chinese state, but since this was a re-
ligion introduced from abroad, whose independence was
forced on China by the guns of the Western powers, the
churches could not readily stand as examples of a religious
institution fully autonomous from the political sphere. Chris-
tianity did have a profound impact on the entire religious
field during this period, becoming a normative model for all
other religious traditions and of the very notion of religion as
a distinct and autonomous category. (4) When it found its
place in the Marxist ideology of the Chinese Communist
Party, however, the state-religion distinction came to desig-
nate not two autonomous spheres, but an opposition be-
tween two types of political forces, the dictatorship of the
proletariat on the one hand and the instruments of feudalism
and imperialism on the other. The  state - led  institutionali sa-t ion of  re l ig ion in  the  PRC
When the CCP took power in 1949, it thus considered
the religious question solely from the angle of political
struggle, both in terms of long-term vision and short-term
pragmatic considerations. The purpose of religious policy
was to eviscerate religious communities of their connec-
tions with political enemies and turn them into instru-
ments of the Communist Party’s United Front, all the
while making efforts to avoid alienating religious believers,
and, while respecting their freedom of belief, leave them
to naturally wither away as the class basis of religion dis-
appeared. No space was given to those forms of religios-
ity that had no potential symbolic and institutional auton-
omy from the feudal and semi-colonial structures of the
old society: Confucianism, disorganised since the collapse
of the imperial examination system and mandarinate, was
completely banned as the very essence of “feudalism”; (5)
the thousands of redemptive societies, (6) which aimed to
reformulate and revive traditional religion, were ruthlessly
persecuted as “reactionary sects and secret societies”; the
millions of communal cults, deeply rooted in traditional
rural society, were stigmatised as “feudal superstition”; (7)
and only Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism (and, as an af-
terthought, monastic Daoism), with their international
recognition as world religions, their self-contained scrip-
tural and symbolic systems, and their easily identifiable
clerical institutions, were accorded legitimacy as “reli-
gion,” and organised into state-sponsored national patriotic
associations under the supervision of the State Council’s
Religious Affairs Bureau (RAB), while cooperative reli-
gious leaders as individuals were dealt with by the United
Front Department of the CCP. 
This article focuses on the state-led institutionalisation of re-
ligion from the post-Mao era until today, and its effect on the
structuring of China’s religious field. This institutionalisation
has been limited to those recognised religions, and has ex-
cluded not only the other forms of religiosity mentioned
above – which did and still do represent a far greater portion
of China’s religious field – but also newer forms of indige-
nous and global forms of religiosity that have appeared in
China since the 1980s. For lack of space, this article focuses
on the religious institutions of the Han majority, and among
them, more attention will be paid to Buddhism and Daoism
– for which the impact of institutionalisation has been the
most profound, since there is no historical experience of na-
tional religious institutions, creating an unprecedented level
of national integration of these two religions’ clerical net-
works and liturgies. (8) This is not a study of the grassroots re-
ligious life of these communities, but of the institutional
processes that aim to structure the grassroots – and whose
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4. See David A. Palmer and Vincent Goossaert, The Religious Question in Modern China,
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, forthcoming, chap. 3. 
5. Anna Xiao Dong Sun, “The Fate of Confucianism as a Religion in Socialist China:
Controversies and Paradoxes,” in Fenggang Yang and Joseph B. Tamney (eds.), State,
Market, and Religions in Chinese Societies, Leiden, Brill, 2005, pp. 229-254.
6. The “redemptive societies” were a wave of salvational movements that appeared in the
first decades of the twentieth century, which typically combined the union of the Three
Teachings (Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism, to which Christianity and Islam were
often added) with spirit-writing, philanthropy, and a milleniarian eschatology, and often
adopted modern forms of organisation and teaching. See Prasenjit Duara, Sovereignty
and Authenticity. Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield,
2003, pp. 103-104; David A. Palmer, “Redemptive Societies: Historical Phenomenon or
Sociological Category?,” forthcoming in Minsu ch’ü-yi. 
7. Vincent Goossaert, “Le destin de la religion chinoise au 20e siècle,” Social Compass, vol.
50, no. 4, 2003, pp. 429-40. 
8. See Vermander’s and Goossaert and Fang’s contributions to this issue. The cases of eth-
nic minority religions, such as Tibetan Buddhism and the Islamic faith of the Hui and
Uyghurs, as well as those of Catholic and Protestant Christianity, have played a funda-
mental role in the Chinese state’s formulation of religious policy. But they have dominat-
ed the academic literature on Chinese religious policy, as well as international media
attention, while China’s religious mainstream has been relatively ignored. Since these
religions are associated with either strong non-Han ethnic identities or with strong for-
eign-based religious institutions, they tend to generate more clearly differentiated rela-
tions between state and religion. On Tibet, see Melvyn C. Goldstein, The Snow Lion and
the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama, Berkeley, University of California Press,
1997, and Melvyn C. Goldstein and Matthew T. Kapstein (eds.), Buddhism in
Contemporary Tibet: Religious Revival and Cultural Identity, Berkeley, University of
California Press, 1998. On Islam in China, see Dru C. Gladney, Muslim Chinese: Ethnic
Nationalism in the Peoples’ Republic, Cambridge, MA, Council on East Asian Studies,
Harvard University, 1996. On Protestantism, see Daniel H. Bays, “Chinese Protestant
Christianity Today,” The China Quarterly, no. 174, 2003, pp. 488-504; Alan Hunter and
Kim-Kwong Chan, Protestantism in Contemporary China, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1993; on Catholicism, see Richard Madsen, China’s Catholics: Tragedy
and Hope in an Emerging Civil Society, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1998. 
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actors typically complain about how difficult it is to organise
the people, with their low levels of education and suzhi. (9)
My discussion focuses on what Vermander calls the state’s
“functionalisation” of religion — how it creates what Feng-
gang Yang has called the “red market” of religion in China,
in which “the red stain [of communist ideology] is reflected
in the rhetoric of clergy, theological discourse, and practices
of the sanctioned religious groups.” (10) As with secular state-
building in China, the degree of institutionalisation is
stronger at the national level and is significantly weaker in
more remote localities. (11) The process does, nonetheless,
profoundly shape the religious field. Institutionalisation is un-
derstood here as formulated by Ji Zhe, taking inspiration
from Giddens: 
An “institution” could be conceived of as the general
manner of the reproduction of rules and resources. If
an organization is reconfigured by the encompassing
external institutional arrangement, so that its structure
and its rules about the reproduction and distribution
of resources tend to be identical with its institutional
environment, then it can be seen as an ‘institutional-
ized’ organization. (12)
On the one hand, the rejection of revolutionary icono-
clasm and radicalism, and the policy of reform and open-
ing up, has led to a greater tolerance toward religion; and
an increasingly prominent discourse on the positive con-
tributions of religion to philanthropy and social morality
has even led to an exploration of ways of positively en-
couraging the development of religion. On the other
hand, the Leninist model of state control of religious in-
stitutions has been retained and even reinforced as the
state has expanded and modernised its bureaucracy. This
tendency has been spurred by fears of political chal-
lenges and separatism emanating from an exploding pop-
ular religiosity – as in the case of Falun Gong (13) – and
foreign links to religious communities, as in the case of
Tibetans and Uyghurs. The tension between these two
tendencies could only be resolved through strengthening
religious orthodoxy, at the level of both discourse and in-
stitutions, so that religion could play its assigned role as
an adjunct to social development, while also warding off
political and separatist threats. The post-Mao religious
institutionalisation, however, has not been a purely top-
down enterprise as it had been in the 1950s; it is a proj-
ect in which religious leaders, government officials, and
scholars have invested themselves, combining different
discursive regimes and forming a hybrid religio-bureau-
cratic institution. At the same time, the narrowness of
the legitimate category of religion has reinforced the de-
institutionalisation of other forms of religiosity, which
have been forced to exist as dispersed networks or as un-
derground organisations, and/or to seek institutionalisa-
tion under other categories such as health, tourism, or
heritage, leading them to become partly or fully assimi-
lated into the secular logics of those categories. In the
past few years, state religious authorities have recognised
the existence of such phenomena and become more
open to a potential broadening of the category of reli-
gion. But the logic of state-led religious institutionalisa-
tion implies that such a broadening does not lead to a
“freeing up” of the religious sphere along the Western
model of church-state separation, but rather to the diffi-
culty of expanding institutional management over an
ever-growing religious domain.
The patriotic religious associations created under the CCP’s
guidance in the 1950s were, for all five religions concerned,
entirely new institutional formations. Never in history had
China’s Buddhists, Daoists, or Muslims been united in a
China-wide organisation (there had been many attempts in
the Republican period [1911-1949], but most of these had
failed (14)). The multifarious Protestant sects and denomina-
tions were forced to merge into a single unit, cut off from
overseas churches and missionary societies. And the
Catholic association took orders from Zhongnanhai instead
of the Vatican. Even within these five religions, the bound-
aries of legitimate religiosity were clearly drawn, excluding
“feudal superstition” (especially in the cases of Buddhism
19N o  2 0 0 9 / 4
9. See Kang Xiaofei’s and Cao Nanlai’s contributions to this issue. 
10. Fenggang Yang, “The Red, Black, and Gray Markets of Religion in China,” The
Sociological Quarterly, no. 97, 2006, p. 97. 
11. For a bottom-up approach to this question, see David A. Palmer, “Religiosity and Social
Movements in China: Divisions and Multiplications,” in Gilles Guiheux & K. E. Kuah-
Pearce (eds.), Social Movements in China and Hong Kong: The Expansion of Protest
Space, Amsterdam, ICAS/Amsterdam University Press, pp. 257-282. Ken Dean, "Further
Partings of the Way: The Chinese State and Daoist Ritual Traditions in Contemporary
China", in Ashiwa and Wank (eds), op.cit., pp.178-210
12. Ji Zhe, “Secularization as Religious Restructuring: Statist Institutionalization of Chinese
Buddhism and its Paradoxes,” in Mayfair Yang (ed.), Chinese Religiosities: Afflictions of
Modernity and State Formation, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2008, pp. 239-
240; referring to Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure
and Contradiction in Social Analysis, London, Macmillan, 1979; The Constitution of
Society, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1984.  
13. See David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, New York, Oxford University
Press, 2008. 
14. On Buddhism, see Holmes Welch, Buddhism under Mao, Cambridge, Harvard University
Press, 1972. On the Republican-era religious associations, see Vincent Goossaert,
“Republican Church Engineering: The National Religious Associations in 1912 China,” in
Mayfair Mei-hui Yang (ed.), Chinese Religiosities: Afflictions of Modernity and State
Formation, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2008, pp. 209-232.
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and Daoism), links with “imperialist powers” (especially in
the cases of Protestantism and Catholicism), and all groups
that refused to submit to the authority of the patriotic associ-
ations (again especially in the cases of the Christian churches,
as well as a portion of the Tibetan Buddhist clergy (15)).
The Cultural Revolution had seen all the socialist religious
institutions abolished, from the United Front Department to
the Religious Affairs Bureau and the Associations, as reli-
gion became a direct target to be eliminated. In the period
of “reform and opening up” from 1979 onwards, this system
was re-instated, but in a radically different context. Even
when the state stepped back to leave more space for reli-
gious activity, there were no strong indigenous religious in-
stitutions to occupy that space – in sharp contrast to the Or-
thodox and Catholic churches that quickly reinvested the re-
ligious field in post-socialist Eastern Europe and Russia. In
the absence of a single, dominant religious institution, the
Chinese state continued, by will and by default, to play the
central role of defining and protecting religious orthodoxy.
Historically, China’s religious institutions had already been
weak before 1949; the PRC regime had created new insti-
tutions in the 1950s, but they had been primarily political
creations, and were gutted by the Cultural Revolution. But
it was these associations that were called on to organise
China’s resurgent religiosity, and that needed to be
strengthened and further institutionalised. The state at-
tempted to shift from ideological dogmatism to the political
co-optation of religious leaders, the bureaucratic manage-
ment of religious communities, and the harnessing of reli-
gious resources to the goals of economic development and
social harmony. 
The state-led institutionalisation of Buddhism, Catholicism,
Daoism, Islam, and Protestantism has created a relatively
homogenous institutional structure for these five traditions,
a hybrid of the secular socialist work unit (danwei) and tra-
ditional forms of clerical organisation, which has become
constitutive of the religious habitus of the leaders of these
communities. (16) The danwei is the modular system of
nested units under which, in socialist China, all units of pro-
duction and administration were nationalised and organ-
ised, and to which all workers were assigned for life, provid-
ing not only work but also residential, leisure and welfare fa-
cilities. While officially registered religious communities, as
associations, are not fully-fledged danwei, they partake of
the same institutional logic: bureaucratic positions (such as
huizhang, “chairman,” bangongshi zhuren, “general man-
ager,” etc.) take precedence over, or even fully replace ec-
clesiastic rank; the key hierarchical relationships are those
between the Association Chairman (who is usually also the
abbot or leading cleric of the main temple or church within
a given jurisdiction) and the representatives of the CCP
United Front branch and the Religious Affairs Bureau.
These relationships play themselves out in the appointment
of personnel to other positions and in the internal politics of
resource allocation. Rewards for performance, in the form
of increased resources and appointment to higher adminis-
trative rank or to prestigious political positions (Peoples’
Consultative Conferences), give as much weighing to polit-
ical as to religious abilities. All of these performances, po-
sitions, and resources are negotiated through the guanxi cul-
ture of relationship management, which pervades the reli-
gious institutions as much as any secular institution. 
As most danwei have, since the 1990s, been encouraged and
even required to become self-subsisting in the market econ-
omy, so have the religious communities, which have been
pressured to post positive economic performance by selling
profit-making services and commodities. (17) However, while
the danwei system was largely dismantled in the late 1990s,
reducing if not eliminating most enterprises’ requirement of
political performance and leaving them free to live or die in
the market, religious associations are among the categories of
units along with schools, government administrations, the
army, and strategic industries that remain under close politi-
cal supervision. Religious danwei today are thus hybrids of
religious culture with the institutional habitus of work units in
the socialist market economy. This hybridisation is not an
easy process, and can be painful to religious practitioners
seeking spiritual purity. Nor are the relations between the dif-
ferent components of the institutional structure always harmo-
nious; indeed, conflicts are frequent, sometimes even violent,
between clerics, official associations, and the religious affairs
authorities, or between religious institutions and non-religious
units such as tourism authorities fighting over the use of sce-
nic sites and their revenues. (18) But these conflicts, and the
norms of playing them out and solving them, are themselves
20 N o  2 0 0 9 / 4
15. For an analysis of CCP policy toward religion from 1921 to 1966, see David A. Palmer
and Vincent Goossaert, op. cit., chap. 6; for a collection of primary texts from 1949 to
1970, see Donald E. MacInnis, Religious Policy and Practice in Communist China,
London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1972. 
16. See Billioud and Thoraval’s contribution to this issue for a discussion of the juxtaposi-
tion of the post-Mao socialist habitus and traditional Confucian ritual sacrality. 
17. See Yang Der-ruey, “The Changing Economy of Temple Daoism in Shanghai,” in
Fenggang Yang and Joseph B. Tamney (eds.), State, Market, and Religions in Chinese
Societies, Leiden, Brill, 2005, pp. 113-148; Graeme Lang, Selina Chan, and Lars
Ragvald, “Temples and the Religious Economy,” ibid. pp. 149-180. 
18. See, for example, the case of Nanputuo described in David Wank, “Institutionalizing
Modern ‘Religion’ in China’s Buddhism: Political Phases of a Local Revival,” in Yoshiko
Ashiwa and David L. Wank (eds), op.cit., pp. 126-150. 
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constitutive of the institutional order. In order to understand
this process of institutionalisation, we need to consider the
discursive networks in which the boundaries and forms of re-
ligion as a distinctive institution are defined, and the regula-
tions that aim to translate the discourse into reality, and then
consider the specific structure of the official bodies that cre-
ate and reproduce these institutional forms. While I discuss
discourses and institutions separately for ease of presentation,
we should bear in mind that the two are in fact mutually con-
stitutive. The  discursive network  on re l ig ion
Each political system has its own regime of producing a dis-
course on legitimate forms of religion. This discourse not
only assigns ideas, practices, and groups into a category of
religion, with distinct rights, restrictions, and positions
within the range of functionally differentiated social institu-
tions in a given society, but also contributes to shaping the
internal structure and norms of the religious groups them-
selves. Discourses on religion in the Peoples’ Republic of
China should be seen in the context of the broader econ-
omy of discourse production and circulation between vari-
ous official and unofficial actors, including Party leaders
and organs, government departments, academic institutions,
religious leaders and followers, and the media. We also
need to bear in mind how, within this economy, a whole set
of categories has evolved, often in opposition to each other,
each of which has been used to label phenomena related to
what, in anthropological terms, may broadly be considered
as pertaining to the religious domain. These categories in-
clude “religion” zongjiao, of course, but also mixin (super-
stition), fandong huidaomen (reactionary secret society),
and xiejiao (evil cult); minjian xinyang (popular faith) as
well as wenhua (culture) and wenwu (cultural relic), fei
wuzhi wenhua yichan (intangible cultural heritage), minsu
(folk customs), minzu fengqing (exotic ethnic customs), and
anything that can be categorised as a “tourist resource”; as
well as “nourishing life,” “qigong,” “martial arts,” “Chinese
medicine,” “sports,” and “science”; and even “philan-
thropy,” “National studies,” and “international exchange.”
Each of these categories is part of a distinct discursive net-
work, entailing a different type of dynamic relationship with
the state and its definitions of orthodoxy, and producing a
different logic of organisation and action, within the com-
mon structure of what Billioud and Thoraval, in their con-
tribution to this issue, call the “post-Mao habitus.”  
In the case of “religion,” the discursive network is composed
of Party leaders giving speeches on religion; the United
Front Department and the Religious Affairs Bureaus at the
national, provincial, and local levels; several types of academic
institution—notably the Institute for World Religions of the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and departments of phi-
losophy and religious studies at the main universities, some of
which dominate academic discourse on a certain religion
(such as Sichuan University’s Institute for Daoism and Reli-
gious Culture); (19) and the leaders of the five religious associ-
ations, and of the official training institutes and seminaries of
those religions. These different types of persons (officials, ac-
ademics, religious leaders) have different perspectives but
share a globally reformist outlook that generally encourages a
secularised, ethical vision of religion; academics, no less than
the religious leaders, have been active in formulating their vi-
sion of how the religion they study should modernise. 
Members of the discursive network on religion, as officials,
scholars, or state-recognised religious leaders, are expected
to speak within the framework of broader Party policy. As
such, their pronouncements carry a certain degree of author-
ity and contribute to official discourse on religion. On the
other hand, each has his own interests, allegiances, and in-
tegration into other discursive networks, so that there is a
clear difference in the perspectives of the discursive actors.
As Ryan Dunch has aptly formulated, a given policy pro-
nouncement “functions as both code and cover: code for a
set of officially sanctioned expectations, and cover for a
broad range of intellectual and theological agendas invoking
it as legitimation.” (20) Party policy thus creates a common dis-
cursive framework that is invested and reproduced by actors
with different interests and loyalties. The primary allegiance
of religious affairs officials is to the government—but within
the government they often see themselves (or are seen) as
defenders of religious interests, or as promoters of a
“proper” form of religion. Religious leaders toe the Party
line in order to protect the interests of their communities,
and also to reinforce their authority within the community.
Scholars typically have a more liberal attitude than the gov-
ernment, but also need to establish and protect the legiti-
macy of their field of study, and they use academic norms of
distance and objectivity to balance their sympathies with the
religions they study. The best known case is the “cultural
Christians,” academics and intellectuals who do not explic-
21N o  2 0 0 9 / 4
19. Fenggang Yang, “Between Secularist Ideology and Desecularizing Reality,” in Yang and
Tamney (eds), op. cit., pp. 19-40. 
20. Ryan Dunch, “Christianity and ‘Adaptation to Socialism’,” in Mayfair Yang (ed.), op. cit.,
p. 172. 
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itly profess belief in Christianity but take a Christian stand-
point to engage in a critique of China’s moral and social
problems. (21) Another example is a network of scholars
claiming the label of “New Daoism” xin daojia, who argue
that Daoism should develop a new ideology for the twenty-
first century based on environmentalism, gender equality,
and traditional culture. (22) We may also cite the widespread
influence among academics and intellectuals of reformist
Buddhism through the writings and initiatives of clerics such
as Hsing Yun or Jinghui. (23) It is in this context of multiple
allegiances and complex motives that discourse on religion is
generated through various publications and journals, and
through meetings and conferences that might include one or
several categories of discursive actor.The  evolving  discourse of  Partyleaders
Speeches of CCP leaders, and a few related official docu-
ments, provide the overarching framework for the discursive
network on religion. These documents and speeches, of
course, take into account the other voices within the discur-
sive network, and also react to the general evolution of the
domestic and international political context. They provide
the guidelines for drafting national regulations on religion,
which are few in number; the bulk of the administrative texts
that apply to religious institutions are actually enacted at the
provincial or local level, with much more detail on proce-
dures, and also with a high decree of discrepancy between
different places—reflecting the even higher degree of dis-
crepancy in the actual practices of local officials, who are
quite open to reform and experimentation in some places
and bent on tight control in others. Details of the rituals and
practices (divination, healing rites…) that are allowed or
banned vary greatly from province to province. (24)
Every few years, speeches by the CCP’s top leaders set the
tone for the discourse on religion. Each time, there have
been subtle adjustments in the discourse, in which the Marx-
ist doctrine of the “disappearance of religion” is deferred to
an ever more distant future, while the positive contributions
of religion to society are given an ever-greater recognition.
At the same time, the fundamental premise—of the CCP’s
ultimate authority over religion, and its duty to control and
guide its development—has remained unchanged. 
An important discursive change occurred when, in the early
1980s, scholars were permitted to debate and re-interpret
Marx’s comments on “religion as the opium of the masses,”
claiming that this statement applied to the role of religion in
nineteenth-century Germany and not to the essence of reli-
gion itself. (25) This opened the way for religion to be de-
picted as having positive as well as negative factors. The
new thinking was reflected in a document issued by the
CCP Central Committee on 31 March 1982 entitled “The
basic viewpoint and policy on the religious question during
our country’s socialist period,” (26) often referred to as “Doc-
ument 19,” and which was both a revision of the Party’s
basic viewpoint on religion and an outline of specific poli-
cies and regulations. The document stated that in socialist
China, now that class exploitation had been successfully
eradicated, “the class root of the existence of religion was
virtually lost.” But since peoples’ consciousness lags behind
changes in social structure, old ways of thinking will con-
tinue to persist, people will still need religion at times of dis-
aster and misfortune, and religion will not disappear until
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the long stage of socialism is completed and communism is
realised. (27)
Document 19 provided the ideological justification for the
restoration of religious life following the Cultural Revolution,
and for the protection of freedom of individual religious belief
enshrined in the revised Constitution of 1982. (28) The official
religious associations were reinstated, officially designated
places of religious worship were re-opened, and religious com-
munities were allowed and even encouraged to engage in in-
ternational exchanges with their coreligionists. But the policy
drew a clear line between “normal” religious life, which was
permitted, and other illegal activities. The 1982-1984 crack-
down on “spiritual pollution” targeted those activities: reac-
tionary secret societies (huidaomen) and “spirit-mediums and
witches” (shenhan wupo) were to be prevented from return-
ing to activity, while practitioners of superstitious professions
such as divination, physiognomy, numerology, and fengshui
were to be re-educated to find another profession to make a
living; if they persisted, they were to be disbanded. The build-
ing of lineage halls and ancestral shrines was also banned, and
those already built were to be expropriated. (29)
Notwithstanding these campaigns, religious activities rapidly
multiplied in the more open atmosphere of the 1980s. The
growing contacts with foreign religious networks began to
worry CCP leaders. This concern became especially salient
following the collapse of the USSR and during the Tianan-
men student movement of 1989, and led to a crackdown on
underground Catholic and Protestant leaders in 1990-
1991. (30) At a “National Religious Work Conference” held
in December 1990, Jiang Zemin stressed the importance of
religious work in order to ensure ethnic harmony and protect
China’s territorial integrity, and to struggle against infiltration
by foreign religious forces as well as against those, including
Christians, who, through developing churches, were sus-
pected of attempting, from the bottom-up, to put pressure on
the CCP to lead China on the road to democracy. (31) These
points were laid out in a new policy document, “Document
6,” issued by the CCP Central Committee and the State
Council on 5 February 1991, (32) which called for a reinforce-
ment of the institutional management of religion, and
prompted provincial and municipal authorities in several ju-
risdictions to issue detailed regulations. 
The main culprits of religious infiltration and political inter-
ference were, in the 1980s, seen to be the Roman Catholic
Church and Protestant missionary societies. (33) The possibil-
ity of establishing diplomatic relations with the Vatican car-
ried the risk of the Holy See attempting to control Chinese
Catholics. (34) Protestant missionising was also seen as a
threat through its multi-pronged strategies of evangelism. In-
creasingly, the influence of the “Dalai Lama clique” based
in India and widely supported in the West was also blamed
for stoking Tibetan separatism, and the possibility of Mus-
lims in Central Asia promoting the idea of an independent
“East Turkestan” among the Uyghurs of Xinjiang, especially
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, was also feared. (35)
Jiang Zemin invited the leaders of the five religions to
Zhongnanhai twice in 1991 and 1992 to discuss these issues
and stress the importance of the “adaptation of religion to
socialism.” At a meeting of the United Front in November
1993, Jiang explained that the concept of “adaptation to so-
cialism” meant that religious believers were free to keep
their theism and their religious faith, but politically they
should love the motherland and defend the socialist system
and the leadership of the CCP. (36) They were to change
their teachings and institutions that were not compatible
with socialism, and use the positive aspects of religious
teachings, practices, and morality to serve socialism. For ex-
ample, cultural relics could be used for cultural development
and patriotic education. Religious teachings and concepts
could be used for socialist development, such as the liberal
“theological construction” advocated by Protestant Bishop
Ding Guangxun (1915-), (37) the Catholic notion of “love the
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Nation and love the Faith,” the Buddhist theory of “human-
istic Buddhism” understood as using Buddhism to serve so-
ciety, (38) and the Muslim idea that “patriotism is part of
faith.” Religious teachings on morality could be used to im-
prove the moral standards of the people, and international
religious exchanges could contribute to building friendships
and unifying the motherland (Hong Kong, Macau, and Tai-
wan). The government would help them adapt to socialism
by identifying the useful elements of their religious tradition,
encouraging them to eliminate their unhealthy habits and
teachings, encouraging them to participate in economic de-
velopment, and giving them the role of bridges between the
Party-state and the masses. (39)
By the early 2000s, the tenor of speeches on religion was
becoming even more positive. On 31 January 2001, Li Rui-
huan (then a member of the Standing Committee of the Po-
litical Bureau of 15th Central Committee of the Communist
Party and Chairman of the 9th National Committee of the
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference,
CPPCC) gave a speech that, for the first time, discussed re-
ligion in a manner that legitimised CCP religious policy
from the standpoint of traditional Chinese culture: much of
Chinese culture is related to religion, he said, noting that
China is a culture of harmonious assimilation, which has al-
ways absorbed different cultures and religions: foreign reli-
gions were constantly absorbing nourishment from Chinese
culture and becoming “sinified.” In that sense, he stated, the
CCP’s policy of religious freedom was in tune with tradi-
tional Chinese culture. (40)
At the end of the same year, at a meeting on religious work,
Jiang Zemin recognised the dual nature of religion, includ-
ing both its negative and positive sides. The list of positive
aspects was longer than in his 1993 speech: religion now
also provided philanthropy, ensured the emotional and psy-
chological stability of the masses, and preserved social order
and stability. He noted the deep historical roots of religion
and its long-term existence and continued influence, and
recognised that religion might continue to exist even after
the disappearance of classes and states – admitting that the
goal of religion’s disappearance was even more distant than
the realisation of communism. (41) Following his speech, an
editorial in the Peoples’ Daily on 13 December 2001 ac-
knowledged that the CCP had the duty to represent the “le-
gitimate interests of the broad masses of religious believers,”
who were recognised as “a positive force in the construction
of socialism with Chinese characteristics.” (42) In a speech on
18 December 2007 at a high-level Party study meeting, Hu
Jintao further reinforced the positive discourse on religion,
stressing that the “basic line” of the CCP’s religious work
was to enable religious people to “play an active role in eco-
nomic and social development”; to help them resolve their
material difficulties and unite them around the goal of build-
ing a “moderately prosperous society” (xiaokang shehui);
and to strengthen the construction of the religious clergy, so
that they would be well-trained to have the political, aca-
demic, and moral foundations for releasing the positive ef-
fect of religion on society. (43)The  system o f  r el ig ious management:  United  Front,Rel ig ious Affa i rs  Bureau,  of f ic ial  associations
It was through the discursive network on religion that the
goals enumerated by Hu Jintao could be carried out. This
network refers to the deeply imbricated system combining
the Party, through the United Front; the state, through the
Religious Affairs Bureau; the religious communities, through
their official associations; and academia, through the Insti-
tute of World Religions of the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, as well as other religious research institutes. The
post-Mao religious institution began to take shape as early as
1978, when the policy of religious freedom was restored at
the 11th Party Congress, and the state was given the man-
date of “strengthening the management” of religion and of
actively guiding the adaptation of religion to socialism –
while emphasising that “feudal superstition” remained
banned. (44) The United Front Department was restored in
1978, and proceeded to rehabilitate religious leaders (no-
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tably those who were famous and of high standing) who had
been persecuted during the Cultural Revolution, and to take
measures to return them to normal religious life. (45) As in the
1950s, religious leaders were appointed to political posi-
tions: by the early 2000s, 10,000 out of 300,000 registered
clerics held positions in Peoples’ Congresses and in Peoples’
Political Consultative Conferences (PPCC) at various lev-
els. (46)
The Religious Affairs Bureau (RAB (47)) was also re-estab-
lished in 1979, and given the tasks of supervising the re-es-
tablishment and operations of the official religious associa-
tions, the registration and management of clergy, and the
registration and management of places of religious worship.
United Front departments and Religious Affairs Bureaus
and commissions were established at each level of govern-
ment: national, provincial, municipal, and district. The
United Front, as a branch of the CCP, is responsible for
dealing with religious leaders as individuals, while the RAB,
as a government unit, is responsible for dealing with the re-
ligious associations as corporate entities. RAB offices were
responsible for administrative oversight of the official associ-
ations of the five recognised religions. The national RAB
had a first division overseeing Buddhism and Daoism, a sec-
ond division for Protestantism and Catholicism, and a third
division for Islam. (A fourth division, for “policy research,”
“popular faith,” and “new religions” was established in
2005, as discussed below). 
In practice, at lower levels of government, it is often the
same official who is in charge of the United Front, of reli-
gious affairs, and of minority nationalities affairs. This is not
a centralised system, however: while lower-level religious af-
fairs and United Front officials are supposed to follow the di-
rectives and policies of the central government, they are ap-
pointed by the provincial and local government and Party
committee, to which they remain accountable, and not to the
central Religious Affairs Bureau and United Front. There
are thus extreme variations in the application of religious pol-
icy at the local level. The same situation prevails in the offi-
cial religious associations, which were established at the
provincial and local levels throughout the 1980s and 1990s:
the leaders of these associations are “elected” by the mem-
bers after extensive consultations with local United Front
and RAB representatives, in order to ensure that the person
elected would have religious legitimacy among the followers,
while at the same time being politically acceptable to the
government—the common understanding being that, if either
of these conditions was not met, the work of the association
would encounter serious difficulties, since it would lose the
support of either the government or of the religious commu-
nity. Since local religious leaders owe their selection to their
local community and local RAB and United Front officials,
their primary loyalty is to these local bodies and not to the
national-level official association. The RAB is responsible
for managing the legal religious communities, while the Pub-
lic Security Bureau (PSB) prosecutes religious activities
deemed illegal. Since the RAB and PSB at a given level ju-
risdiction do not necessarily communicate with each other or
have good relations, policy implementation is not always co-
herent. 
The national-level official religious associations were re-es-
tablished in 1980: the China Buddhist Association, the
China Daoist Association, the China Islamic Association,
and the Protestant and Catholic associations. In the latter
cases, in order to compensate for the lack of legitimacy of
the Mao-era Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association
(CCPA) and of the Protestant Three-Self Patriotic Move-
ment (TSPM), the authorities established new Christian as-
sociations that could focus on internal theological, pastoral,
and liturgical matters, while the Patriotic Associations con-
tinued to handle political relations with the government and
CCP. These new bodies were, for the Catholics, the Na-
tional Conference of Bishops (1980), which was led by
clergy as opposed to the lay CCPA and the National Ad-
ministrative Commission of the Catholic Church in China
(1980), and, for the Protestants, the China Christian Coun-
cil, which had an overlapping membership with the
TSPM. (48) The YMCA and YWCA were also re-estab-
lished in collaboration with the United Front, the Commu-
nist Youth League, and the All-China Womens’ Federation,
to organise the youth activity of Christians and to build ties
with Christian youth in Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and
overseas. (49) Following their establishment at the national
level, provincial and local associations were created. For the
Daoists, for instance, there were 83 local associations in the
early 1990s, 133 by 1999, and more than 200 by the early
2000s. (50)
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The  management o f r el ig iouscle rgy
A key concern of the Religious Affairs authorities and of the
official associations is the ordination, registration, and man-
agement of the five religions’ clergy. To be permitted to work
as religious professionals, clerics need to be acknowledged
by their local religious association, which then sends their
file to the local RAB. In 1997 there were 200,000 Buddhist
monastics, including almost 80,000 Han Mahayana clerics
(about one-third female), 120,000 Tibetan monks and nuns
and 1,700 reincarnate lamas, and 10,000 Theravada monks
among the Dai and other minorities in Yunnan. (These fig-
ures can be compared to those from the early 1950s:
240,000 Han; 400,000 Tibetan and 8,000 Theravada cler-
ics.) The number of Daoist monastics was lower but grow-
ing, with 12,000 in the early 1990s and double that number
a decade later. (51)
“Patriotic education” was implemented in all religious com-
munities from 1994. Here, the main issue was integrating
traditional forms of training and ordination with modern,
standardised procedures being promoted by the state, as well
as the question of political loyalty. For the ordination of
monks, regulations were promulgated by the CBA and
CTA. The first cohort of 47 Buddhist monastics were or-
dained in 1980; in 1987, 1,008 monks were ordained at
Jizushan in Yunnan; the rhythm of Buddhist ordinations ac-
celerated during the early twenty-first century so that about
half the clergy was ordained. For Quanzhen Daoists, shou-
jie ordination ceremonies were reinstated at Baiyunguan in
Beijing for a first cohort of 75, and in 1995, at Qingcheng-
shan, for 400 candidates; for them, the number of ordina-
tions was tiny in relation to the total monastic population. 
The religious authorities are also concerned about the for-
mal training of the clergy. Officials and scholars regularly
lament the poor “quality” (suzhi) of clerics (52) — and stress
the need for raising up a new generation of well-trained reli-
gious leaders. That this should be properly done, under gov-
ernment supervision, is also important so that future genera-
tions of clergy will be loyal to the CCP’s leadership and to
the socialist system. (53) In 1991, the United Front and the
central RAB issued a document detailing a policy to identify
promising young clergy with good political attitudes and reli-
gious knowledge, to nurture them so that within five to ten
years they could become the next generation of religious
leaders. 
The chief instrument for this training is the official religious
academies and seminaries. The year 1980 saw the re-estab-
lishment of the China Buddhist Academy, the China Islamic
Academy, the Nanjing Theological Seminary, and the China
Catholic Seminary. After 1982, local academies were also
created: six Buddhist, five Islamic, five Protestant, and five
Catholic. In their first decade of operation, these academies
produced 2,000 graduates. (54) Specialised Buddhist acade-
mies were set up for Han, Tibetan, and Pali (Theravada)
Buddhism. The China Daoist Academy was finally estab-
lished at Baiyunguan in 1990. By 1997, there was a total of
74 official religious training institutes. These academies and
seminaries are organised in standard academic style, with
courses of study lasting two to four years, followed by exami-
nations and the conferring of a diploma equivalent to an as-
sociate or professional degree, as well as a religious title.
After graduation, the graduates return to their religious units.
The training, which includes political studies, Marxism, and
foreign languages, differs from traditional modes of transmis-
sion, especially for the Daoists; (55) it is often not seen as a
true spiritual education but merely a ticket to advancement in
their official careers, giving clerics the academic and social
background needed to successfully function within the system
of relationship building and bureaucratic politics within which
the religious associations are embedded. If the first leaders
after the re-establishment of the religious associations in
1978-1980 often won huge respect for having survived the
Cultural Revolution and invested all their energy in reviving
their institutions, the next generation lacked such aura. (56) By
the 2000s, a good number of clerics were complaining that
the top levels of the clergy were controlled by clerics with
diplomas (Ph.D. being preferred) who maintained good re-
lationships with officials, spent a large part of their time in
meetings and banquets, and were managers rather than reli-
gious persons, while spiritual training was disappearing.
These bureaucratic leaders are in sharp contrast to charis-
matic types outside of or on the margins of official institu-
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tions, even though a few charismatic Buddhists and Daoists
do get appointments in their associations. (57)Managing  p laces  o f r e l ig ious worship (58)
Another of the tasks of the Religious Affairs authorities is
to negotiate the “return” of religious sites to the official reli-
gious associations—especially famous monasteries, large
churches, and temples in the cities and areas with high con-
centrations of believers, and in ethnic minority areas. Fa-
mous temples and churches of historic value are often re-
stored at the government’s expense, often more to impress
foreign visitors (including official delegations from Buddhist
and Muslim countries) than to accommodate local believers.
The return of temples has been a source of constant conflict,
since most religious venues had been taken over by other
units and departments during the Mao era, and the most im-
portant sites were often under the control of the tourism, cul-
tural relics, or parks administrations, which were not willing
to give them up. In 1983, a policy was enacted to open
“key” national Buddhist and Daoist monasteries to the pub-
lic as places of religious worship, and for them to be man-
aged by monastics. This led to the paltry number of 142
Buddhist and 21 Daoist temples being opened up. Progress
was so slow that, again in 1994, a new directive was issued
by the United Front and the Religious Affairs Bureau to rap-
idly resolve the many outstanding cases. By 1995, there
were 77,981 officially registered places of religious worship:
44 percent were mosques, 40 percent were churches (34
percent Protestant and 6 percent Catholic), 15 percent were
Buddhist monasteries, and 2 percent were Daoist tem-
ples. (59) At the time of writing, over 30 years after the Cul-
tural Revolution, negotiating the transfer of religious sites re-
mains one of the major preoccupations of religious affairs of-
ficials and of the religious associations. 
Officially designated places of worship are, according to Doc-
ument 19, “under the administrative control of the Bureau of
Religious Affairs, but the religious organisations themselves
and professional religious themselves are responsible for their
management.” (60) In the case of Buddhist and Daoist temples,
they are managed by their local Buddhist or Daoist associa-
tion (which often has its offices within the premises of the
major temples), following principles of “democratic manage-
ment” (by resident clerics and not lay temple committees),
under the supervision of the local RAB. Regulations for the
management of temples stipulate the administrative structure
and provide for the protection of historical relics. Religious
life is to be “normalised” zhengchanghua; “normal” religious
life includes scripture recitation in temples, rituals, and self-
cultivation; whereas sorcery, exorcism, divination, spirit pos-
session, spirit-writing, and fengshui, as superstitions, are ille-
gal. Since the latter activities are among the main traditional
sources of revenue for temples, this forced them to seek alter-
native income streams, notably through tourism; however,
market demand, and more relaxed controls by the late 1990s,
means that “superstitious” activities have become increas-
ingly prevalent and visible in temples. Meanwhile, negotiat-
ing their autonomous space and control over resources with
the local RAB and local Buddhist/Daoist association takes
much of the time of temple clerics. (61)
Temples that are major tourist attractions enjoy high levels of
revenue, leading to conflicts among religious associations
and government agencies all claiming a share of the pie. In
some jurisdictions, for example, provincial Daoist associa-
tions levy a fee of 5 percent on the revenues of all temples
under their management. In some areas, RABs have shown
strong interest in profitable temples, and ignored others. In
temples managed by clerics, corrupt relations of profit-shar-
ing between temple abbots and local authorities have been
the topic of frequent controversy. Often, the authorities sim-
ply outsource the management of temples to private busi-
nesses, which invest in the construction and promotion, hire
clerics to staff them, and revert a part of the profits to the
government. (62) The tourist and business potential of Bud-
dhist sites has led to a trend of local authorities and entre-
preneurs building open-air giant Buddhas in order to attract
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62. He Guanghu (ed.), op. cit., p. 210; Lang, Chan and Ragvald, “Temples and the Religious
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tourists and pilgrims—a phenomenon that has been decried
by religious affairs officials. Non-“re l ig ious” or thodoxiesand heterodoxies
The institutional framework for religious affairs described
above is based on a narrow definition of religion that ex-
cludes much of China’s religious culture. The very narrow-
ness of the category of “religion,” restricted to official asso-
ciations of the five recognised religions, and the political sen-
sitivity and restrictions attached to the category, have led to
a rush on the part of other actors, both within and outside
the state, to designate a wide range of practices under non-
religious labels, and thus to secure the legitimacy and legal-
ity of the practices – creating what Fenggang Yang has called
the “grey market” of religion. (63) In so doing, however, they
are subject to the norms associated with that non-religious
category, which were defined and debated within the discur-
sive network surrounding that category. 
A notable case was the body cultivation traditions, which had
been institutionalised under the category of “qigong” in the
1950s, where they were integrated into the discursive network
of medicine, rather than religion. The post-Mao era saw
qigong spread from Chinese medicine into the discursive net-
works of sports, national defence, and science, where, far from
the restrictions and sensitivities of the “religion” label, many
forms of religiosity were able to find expression under a cloak
of legitimacy. For over a decade, from the late 1970s to the
mid 1990s, while officially designated “religious” communities
were banned from holding activities or publicly promoting
their teachings outside the premises of designated places of
worship, thousands of popular qigong groups could freely and
publicly promote meditation, breathing, and gymnastic regi-
mens that were often explicitly based on Buddhist and Daoist
symbols and cosmology, induced trance states, and sometimes
even involved deity worship. (64)
At the same time, by finding a home in the discursive regimes
of medicine and science, qigong was required to submit to the
normative standards and practices of those fields, transforming
and secularising qigong in the process. When the opposite oc-
curred, qigong became the target of a polemical campaign
launched by some scientists and journalists labelling it as a
“pseudo-science,” “superstition,” and as “evil cults,” xiejiao.
The latter appeared in contemporary usage around 1995 in
the wake of the Waco and Aum Shinrikyo incidents in the
United States and Japan. By 1998 it was being used by Bud-
dhists to condemn Falun Gong, and was adopted by the state
to justify its suppression of Falun Gong beginning in July
1999. This led to the formation of a new discursive and insti-
tutional network, that of “evil cults,” made up of the Ministry
of Public Security and its specialised anti-cult units, as well as
state-sponsored anti-cult associations. In the anti-cult dis-
course, xiejiao was defined almost as an anti-religion, in sharp
contrast to religion, which was depicted in unambiguously pos-
itive terms. (65) There was little overlap between the “religion”
and “evil cult” networks: the categories were defined as mutu-
ally exclusive, and recognised religious leaders, scholars, and
officials who dealt with “religion” did everything they could to
keep the two categories impermeable in order to protect the
legitimacy of their own work and avoid being contaminated by
the highly sensitive question of “evil cults.” 
Religiosity also invested the discursive networks of tourism,
Confucianism, and national studies, (66) as well as culture (67)
and intangible cultural heritage. The latter became an offi-
cial category in 2004, after the Chinese government signed
UNESCO’s Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible
Cultural Heritage – which could include performing arts,
craftsmanship, rituals, festivals, and folk customs. The Min-
istry of Culture is responsible for intangible heritage, and the
nationwide network of cultural affairs bureaux, down to the
provincial and county levels, has been mobilised to identify
items of traditional culture to be officially designated as “in-
tangible heritage” and benefit from special heritage protec-
tion and funding. Through this process, local ritual traditions
and cults to popular deities such as Mazu and Jigong – none
of which are recognised as “religion” – have found a new
“canonisation,” while inscribing them into the discursive and
institutional norms of cultural heritage protection. Opening the  category of  r e l ig ion
Official policy has timidly begun to acknowledge the exis-
tence and even the legitimacy of this expanding realm of re-
ligious life. Chinese scholars of religion, sociology, and an-
thropology, through their studies of popular religion and new
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religious movements, and through their adoption of broader
definitions of religion, have contributed to legitimising vast
realms of activity previously stigmatised or excluded from
the category of religion. (68) The increasing intensity of rela-
tionships with the outside world has also led to a realisation
that the religious dimension of such exchanges requires
coming to terms with the religious diversity of China’s inter-
national partners. In 2005, a new set of regulations
(zongjiao shiwu tiaoli) was promulgated, which was largely
a consolidation of previous regulations and policies. (69) A
notable change in these regulations was that the procedure
for the registration of religious associations made no men-
tion of the five official religions, making it theoretically pos-
sible for other religions to register (but no other religion had
succeeded in doing so at the time of writing). Indeed, tak-
ing stock of the reality that the religious world extends far
beyond the five officially registered religions, in the same
year the State Administration of Religious Affairs (SARA,
the former national RAB renamed in 1998) established a
fourth division to look into other groups, especially those
pertaining to “popular faith” minjian xinyang and “new re-
ligions” xinxing zongjiao, as well as to conduct research on
religious policy. 
At the time of writing, there was no explicit policy on pop-
ular faith and new religions, but there was a recognition that
the phenomenon existed and should not be simply banned,
and a willingness to build direct or indirect relationships with
those communities, significantly contributing to removing
any stigma associated with them – as long as they are not
classified as “evil cults” or as challenging the CCP’s author-
ity or the territorial integrity of the PRC. If the category of
“popular faith” (minjian xinyang) has emerged in official re-
search documents as a realm of legitimate religious practices,
it had not, at the time of writing, been built into a recognised
administrative category. Different provinces and localities
have taken different approaches, which are being monitored
by SARA, and have been summarised into three models:
(1) no government interference; (2) registering communal
temples as Daoist (minjian xinyang daojiaohua); or (3) offi-
cially registering them as a new category of “popular faith.”
A conference was held by SARA in 2008 to study the three
options, but none was chosen, leaving the provinces to con-
tinue experimenting. At the same time, there were increas-
ingly explicit indications that communal temples were (along
with Buddhism and Daoism) seen as an important resource
for slowing the growth of Christianity in the countryside. (70)
Other local variations have been observed, such as commu-
nal temples registering as Buddhist, and, exceptionally, tem-
ples of the Three-in-One Teachings (sanyi jiao) have regis-
tered under that label in some parts of Fujian. (71)
Friendly exchanges of delegations have taken place between
the fourth division of SARA and the Confucian Academy
of Hong Kong, which is ardently lobbying for establishing
Confucianism as the national religion of China, (72) as well as
with the Yiguandao redemptive society in Taiwan (still offi-
cially banned on the mainland as a huidaomen, “reactionary
sect and secret society”). The Eastern Orthodox Church,
which has believers among the Russian ethnic minority and
some Chinese in the far Northeast and far Northwest, as
well as historic properties in Beijing and Shanghai, has been
registered for many years at the provincial level in Hei-
longjiang Province and, after long negotiations, Orthodox
religious services were authorised (in the premises of the
Russian consulate) in Shanghai in the spring of 2008. For-
eign Jews living in China – who had a significant historical
presence in Shanghai and Harbin during the early twentieth
century — are allowed to associate and worship, but SARA
refuses to recognise the claims of religious identity by de-
scendants of the Kaifeng Jews, who had settled in China
during the Song dynasty. (73)
For “new religions,” the main cases being dealt with by
SARA are the Bahá’í Faith (74) and the Mormons. (75) Both
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profess strict obedience to the law as part of their religious
teachings and scrupulously avoid establishing religious insti-
tutions in the mainland, earning the trust of the authorities
while, through natural friendships and overseas travel, the
number of Chinese believers grow. Expatriates from the two
religions are allowed to establish associations (limited to for-
eigners) in major cities, while the authorities generally do
not interfere with small-scale, informal gatherings of Chinese
believers held in private homes. (76) While the Mormons reg-
ularly invite Chinese officials and scholars to Brigham Young
University in Utah, which has a strong expertise in religion
and law, SARA and the Bahá’í Assemblies of Macau and
Hong Kong have held regular exchanges of delegations and
joint conferences on building harmony and social develop-
ment, which are important areas of Bahá’í teachings and en-
gagement. (77)
SARA’s contacts with these various groups, however, take
place in the context of official exchanges with Hong Kong,
Macau, Taiwan, or overseas, or with foreigners living in
China, and do not necessarily concern policy toward these
religions in the mainland. Some of the cases have been han-
dled by SARA in the context of managing China’s relations
with Russia (which has aggressively pursued the rights of
China’s Orthodox Christians), Israel (which, at the diplo-
matic level, has ignored the Kaifeng Jews (78)), and the US
(which has pressed for the rights of Mormons under presi-
dents Bush and Obama, who appointed a Mormon as US
ambassador to China (79)). Conclusion
The official Chinese discourse on religion is now explicitly
positive about religion and increasingly friendly towards reli-
gious communities that until recently were actively banned,
stigmatised, or ignored. To be sure, this represents a greater
degree of openness towards religion in general and towards
a greater plurality of forms of religious expression – as long
as they do not challenge the authority of the CCP or the ter-
ritorial integrity of the PRC. But this opening up remains
timid, and its outcome remains to be seen. Such an “open-
ing” should not be understood as leading to an inexorable
American-style deregulation of the religious sphere. Since
1979, China’s religious policy has consistently sought to fur-
ther institutionalise religion under the guidance of the CCP.
The recent speeches by Hu Jintao and CCP policy docu-
ments, with their positive discourse on religion, have not
called for the state stepping out of the religious realm, but
for it to strengthen and expand the official religious institu-
tions and their personnel. The hesitation of the authorities,
in their growing recognition of the religious life going on out-
side those institutions, is not about how much to let it be free
– but about how to effectively institutionalise and manage
such a huge domain of social and cultural life. •
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Glossary
Falun Gong 法論功  fandong huidaomen 反動會道門
fei wuzhi wenhua yichan 非物質文化遺產
fengshui 風水  Hu Jintao 胡錦濤  huizhang 會長
Jiang Zemin 江澤民  Jizushan 雞足山  Li Ruihuan 李瑞環
mixin 迷信  minjian xinyang 民間信仰
minjian xinyang daojiaohua 民間信仰道教化
minsu 民俗  minzu fengqing 民族風情
qigong 氣功  sanyi jiao 三一教  shenhan wupo 神漢巫婆 
shoujie 受戒  xiaokang shehui 小康社會  xiejiao 邪教
xin daojia 新道家  xinxing zongjiao 新興宗教  Tiandijiao 天帝教
wenhua 文化  wenwu 文物  Yiguandao 一貫道
zhengchanghua 正常化  Zhongnanhai 中南海
zongjiao 宗教  zongjiao shiwu tiaoli 宗教事務條例
